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beyond the scope of corporate authority.2 - The Indiana statute makes
no express provision for such an action,25 but the court probably will
continue to follow its former decisions.26 If such injunctions were not
allowed, the only remedy of the non-assenting shareholder would be in
a quo-warranto proceeding to forefeit the charter of the corporation,
or enjoin the exercise of unauthorized powers. 27
The preface of the Indiana General Corporation Act Annotated
states that: "The new Acts are thought to contain the best features
of recent legislation concerning corporations throughout the country,
and should clarify the law governing corporations in Indiana . . ."
This appears to be an overstatement so far as ultra vires is concerned.
P.C.M.
EVIDENCE
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
The New York City council appointed a committee to investigate
charges of negligence and maladministration at the city-controlled
Lincoln Hospital. At the committee hearing, the hospital medical
superintendent withheld confidential case record information on the
grounds that the New York Civil Practices act prohibited a physician
from disclosing any information acquired in attending a patient. Held,
the statutory privilege included examination before legislative com-
mittees. New York City Council v. Goldwater, 31 N. E. (2d) 31.
(N. Y. 1940).
At common law, patient-physician communications were not privil-
eged from disclosure in judicial proceedings. However, statutes have
changed the rule in the majority of the states. 8 WiGMOoE, EVIDENCE
(3d ed. 1939) § 2380. In the principal case the court by a liberal
interpretation applied the privilege to non-judicial proceedings. It
felt the decision was necessary to carry out the policy of the statute.
Buffalo Loan, Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Knights of Templar &
Masonic Mutual Aid Ass'n, 126 N. Y. 450, 454, 27 N. E. 942, 943
(1891). Section 354 of the Civil Practices Act indicates that the
privilege applies to any examination of a physician as a witness. This
was strengthened by dicta in a previous New York case to the effect
that witnesses before the commissioner of accounts were entitled to all
the privileges and protection extended by law to witnesses in judicial
proceedings. Matter of Herschfield v. Hanley, 228 N. Y. 346, 127 N. E.
252 (1920).
A dissent advocated restricting the statute to its "primary purpose."
Buffalo Loan, Trust and Safe-Deposit Co. v. Knights Templar and
2 4 Board of Coifnty Comm'rs. v. Lafayette, M. and B. Ry. Co., 50 Ind.
85 (1875); Mercantile Comm. Bank v. So. Eastern Ind. Coal Corp.,
93 Ind. App. 313, 169 N. E. 91, 171 N. E. 310 (1929); Wright
v. Hughes, 119 Ind. 324, 21 N. E. 907 (1889).
25 Compare statutes cited supra note 19.
2 The drafters of the Uniform Business Corp. Act expect this position
to be taken by the courts. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. (Perm. ed.
1932) 58.
27 Columbian Athletic Club v. State, 143 Ind. 98, 40 N. E. 914 (1895).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Masonic Mut. Aid Ass'n, 126 N. Y. 450, 454, 27 N. E. 942, 943 (1891).
But see Atchinson, T. and S. F. R. Co. vA Reesman, 60 F. 370, 373
(1894). Without the ability to find the facts, legislative investigations
are of little help in preparing intelligent statutes. The privilege shields
from inquiry the very abuse concerning which the public is entitled to
full information. See People ex rel Wood v. Lacombe, 99 N. Y. 43,
49, 1 N. E. 599, 600 (1855) ; City Bank F. T. Co. v. N .Y. C. R. R. Co.,
253 N. Y. 49, 57, 170 N. E. 489, 492 (1930).
J.E.K.
INSURANCE
COVERAGE OF AUTO THEFT POLICY
In two recent cases an automobile was taken without the consent
of the owner by a person in temporary possession, but without the
intent to keep it permanently. Each automobile was insured against
theft. The Indiana Supreme Court denied recovery on the insurance
policy for damages to the car, but a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
allowed recovery.'
The Indiana court followed the weight of authority and defined
theft as synonymous with larceny, requiring the common law intent
to appropriate another's property wholly and permanently.2 The
Federal court allowed recovery, holding that an appropriation incon-
sistent with the property right of the person from whom it was taken
was sufficient.
The general rule in construing insurance contracts is that if the
language is ambiguous or reasonably open to two constructions, the one
most favorable to the insured will be adopted.3 The application of the
rule would include "taking without consent" cases within the coverage
of theft policies. 4
Where state statutes make, vehicle taking a felony but do not
require an intent to permanently deprive, courts generally consider
such taking unprotected by theft policies.5 These cases follow the
1 Home Insurance Co. v. Mathis, 32 N. E. (2d) 108 (Ind. App. 1941);
Pennsylvania Indemnity Fire Corp. v. Aldridge, 117 F. (2d) 774
(App D. C. 1941).
2 Hartford Ins. Co. v. Wimbish, 12 Ga. App. 712, 78 S. E. 265 (1913);
Michigan Comm. Ins. Co. v. Wills, 57 Ind. App. 256, 106 N. E.
725 (1914); Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239
N. Y. 303, 146 N. E. 432 (1923); note (1931) 89 A. L. R. 466.
5 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U. S. 167 (1923);
Stroehman v. Mutual Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 435 (1937). The reason
for such rule is that the insurer can remedy the ambiguity by
inserting an exception in the policy. Allen v. Berkshire Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 105 Vt. 471, 168 Atl. 698 (1933).
4 James v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 209, 225 Pac. 213 (1924); Globe
& Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. House, 163 Tenn. 585, 45 S. W. (2d) 55
(1932); Thomas Investment Co. v. Thompson, 32 S. W. (2d)
708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
5 Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 303, 146
N. E. 432 (1923); Repp v. American Farmer's Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co., 179 Minn. 167, 228 N. W. 605 (1930); LaMotte v. Re-
tail Hdw. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 41, 233 N. W. 566 (1930).
